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Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a “spike” in the 
job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from 
workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. 
End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed 
workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new 
job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment 
spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the 
job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized 
leisure. 
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1 Introduction
In theory, unemployment benets provide a disincentive to benet recipients. The
greater the level of benets relative to the expected wage, the less costly the period
of the job search, so workers tend to search for jobs less intensely and tend to remain
unemployed longer. Putting a limit on the duration of benets tends to speed up the
job search. As the date approaches when benets will expire, unemployed workers
may increase the intensity of their job search and thereby the rate of job-nding.
Moreover, many empirical studies nd that the exhaustion of benets creates a
\spike" in the exit rate from unemployment. Usually, these spikes are found as a
\by-product" of an analysis focusing on the relationship between potential benet
duration (PBD) and exit rates from unemployment.
Mott (1985) is an example of an early US study nding benet exhaustion
spikes. He analyzes administrative unemployment insurance records from the Con-
tinuous Wage and Benet History (CWBH) database. As Mott indicates the main
advantage of administrative data is the high accuracy, while the main disadvantage
is that the variable of interest, the duration of UI benets is truncated at the point
of maximum benets. Most individuals in his data have a maximum benet du-
ration of 26 weeks but some individuals are entitled to extended benets up to 13
weeks. Mott nds that the unemployment exit rate at 26 weeks is 3 times the
exit rate one month before benet expiration. At 39 weeks there is a spike in the
exit rate which is about 2 times the regular exit rate. Meyer (1990) analyzes the
same CWBH data as Mott using a more extensive statistical model nding similar
results: the exit rate in the week before benet exhaustion is about twice the size of
the usual exit rate. Katz and Meyer (1990a) use two datasets, the CWBH dataset
and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The results concerning the
spike at benet exhaustion using the CWBH data are similar to previous studies:
in the week of benet expiration the exit rate is about 80% higher. The survey data
allow for a distinction between transitions to jobs at the previous employer (recalls)
and transitions to new jobs. In both cases there is a substantial increase in the job
nding rate close to benet exhaustion.1 Katz and Meyer (1990b) use CWBH data
supplemented with telephone interviews to provide additional information. They
1 Katz and Meyer also show that such spikes are not present for UI non-recipients.1 Introduction 3
nd spikes in the job nding rates in the exhaustion week which are 2.2-2.3 times
the usual job nding rate, both for recalls and new jobs. Card and Levine (2000)
analyze administrative data from the New Jersey Extended Benet Program. They
nd that the exit rate in the week of benet exhaustion is about twice as large as
the regular exit rate.
There are also quite a few European studies that nd spikes near benet ex-
haustion. Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996) analyze Swedish data and
nd a big increase in the outow from unemployment to labor market programs
whereas the increase in the exit rate to employment is substantially smaller. Roed
and Zhang (2003) nd for Norwegian unemployed that the exit rate out of unem-
ployment increases sharply in the months just prior to benet exhaustion with the
eect being larger for females than for males. Adamchik (1999) nds a strong in-
crease in re-employment probabilities around benet expiration in Poland. Lalive
et al. (2006) analyze Austrian social security data nding large spikes in the exit
rate out of unemployment at benet exhaustion. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006)
studying PBD reductions in Slovenia nd both strong eects on the exit rate out of
unemployment and substantial spikes around benet exhaustion; the spikes in the
job nding rate in the month prior to benet exhaustion are 2.2-2.5 times as high
as the usual job nding rate. In a recent study that focuses exclusively on the end-
of-benet spike phenomenon Card et al. (2007) nd that the unemployment exit
rate increases much more than the re-employment hazard rate does. Their main
conclusion is that the spike in unemployment-exit rates is to a large extent due to
measurement error. Researchers mistake leaving the unemployment register for job
nding.
Part of the criticism by Card et al. (2007) on previous studies may be valid as
some studies are based on unemployment exits up to point of benet exhaustion
only. But, there are also studies that focus on job nding rates and nd benet
exhaustion spikes. This indicates that the benet exhaustion spike is more than a
statistical artefact. As we discuss in more detail in the next section theoretical work
based on non-stationary search theory explains the increase in the job nding rate
towards benet exhaustion (Mortensen (1977) and Van den Berg (1990)). However,
these studies do not explain why it falls again after expiration, which is needed to1 Introduction 4
get a spike.2
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we provide a theoretical
explanation for the existence of benet exhaustion spikes, which are caused by delays
in job acceptance. Our theoretical model suggests that spikes in job nding rates
are more likely to occur for permanent jobs than for temporary jobs. Second, we use
a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction. The existence
of end-of-benet spikes per se in Slovenia has been shown before but this was a
by-product of an analysis on the impact of changes in potential benet duration on
job nding rates (Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006)). Here, we focus on the nature of
the benet exhaustion spikes. We show that indeed these spikes are more important
in transitions from unemployment to permanent jobs than they are in transitions
from unemployment to temporary jobs.
This paper is set-up as follows. In section 2 we present our theoretical model
in which individuals optimize the delay in job acceptance. In a stationary labor
market the job nding rate equals the job oer arrival rate, but initially, because
of the delay period no jobs are accepted. When an individual approaches benet
expiration the delay is reduced as no individual will want to accept a job oer beyond
the point of benet expiration. This delay behavior causes a spike at the point of
benet expiration. Delays in accepting job oers will not always occur. In case
of temporary jobs delaying the start will not be acceptable to rms. Therefore, in
the transition rate to temporary jobs an end of benet spike is less likely to occur.
In section 3 we discuss our data and present some stylized facts. Using data from
the Slovenian unemployment register we present \eyeball" evidence supporting our
delay theory. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis. We investigate
whether job nding spikes at benet exhaustion are smaller for temporary jobs. We
nd that this is indeed the case. Section 5 concludes.
2 Suggested explanations for the benet spike include the strategic timing of job starting dates
and implicit contracts between unemployed workers and their previous employers, in which the
employers rehire the workers at about the time their benets expire (Card and Levine, 2000).
However, these are notions rather than formalized theories. Also, the explanation provided by
Card and Levine (2000) is very much related to the US labor market as in almost all European
labor markets temporary layos do not occur.2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 5
2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory
We aim to explain the spike in the outow from unemployment around the time the
unemployment benet expires. Therefore, we cannot use stationary models where
unemployment benets are paid irrespective of unemployment duration (or where
the benet entitlement is lost with an constant probability per period). We assume
that for a duration T the unemployed worker is entitled to unemployment benets
b > 0. After expiration the benets drop to a level normalized to zero.
Two well known papers on nonstationarity in job search theory are Mortensen
(1977) and Van den Berg (1990). In this setting, Van den Berg (1990) implies that
the job acceptance probability increases with duration, jumps up at time T and
stays (that) high thereafter. Intuitively, if the benet has dropped (to zero) the
value of unemployment becomes so low that almost any job becomes acceptable.
This reduces the reservation wage and hence increases the job acceptance rate.
Thus, this analysis does not explain a spike in exit rates at T as the exit rate does
not fall after T.
Mortensen's (1977) model can explain a spike if one is willing to assume that
income and leisure are substitutes. In that case, acceptance rates increase with
duration and drop (discontinuously) at T to a lower level. As the benet drops to
zero, leisure substitutes for income thereby reducing search eort (which takes up
leisure time). In the case where leisure and income are complements (leisure is more
enjoyable if there is more money to spend), the acceptance probability jumps up at
T and stays high thereafter. We nd the assumption that income and leisure are
complements more convincing since this is in line with all literature on the eects
of the level of benets on the job nding rate.3 Moreover, even in the case of
substitutes, it is not clear why these eects would dier for dierent type of jobs.
There are also studies that use a static labor supply theory to motivate the
existence of an end-of-benet spike. Then, it is assumed that a new job can be
found at any time (Meyer (1990) and Mott and Nicholson (1982)). At the time a
worker loses his job he decides on consumption and the duration of unemployment
3 Note that the case of income and leisure being substitutes would imply that an increase in
unemployment benets increases the job nding rate. A prediction that is clearly at odds with
empirical research (see for example Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)).2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 6
subject to a budget constraint. At the expiration date T the budget constraint is
kinked and hence many indierence curves are tangent at the kink. Therefore, many
individuals choose to leave unemployment at benet expiration, which explains the
spike in the outow rate at T. However, this static model is less suitable as a
framework to study benet exhaustion spikes because it does not explain why the
size of the spike depends on the type of job. As we show below in our empirical
analysis benet exhaustion spikes are larger for permanent than for temporary jobs.
In fact, one can argue that in the Meyer (1990) and Mott and Nicholson (1982)
framework to the extent that temporary jobs are easier to nd than permanent jobs,
this theory would predict a larger spike for temporary jobs.4
We propose a model where rms and workers are matched and then decide on
the wage and the starting date of the job. We rst describe the rm side of the
story and then move on to the worker. Then we show how a delay in the starting
date generates a spike in the outow rate.
2.1 Delay
Consider a rm that has found a worker with productivity q. This worker yields a
surplus to the rm equal to s(q) with s0(q) > 0. Typically, s(q) will be of the form
q   w(q) where the wage increases with q but w0(q) < 1.
Let l denote the length of the contract that the rm oers the worker and  the
period for which the worker would like to postpone actually starting to work. Then















where  denotes the discount rate. We assume here that the rm has work for a
period l independent of when this is done.5
4 Note that the story in Meyer (1990) and Mott and Nicholson (1982) is not necessarily dy-
namically consistent. When a worker loses his job, a \holiday" of T periods looks nice enough, but
a week before T he might like to re-optimize and extend his holiday. With such re-optimization
it is not clear that many workers return to work at the kink in the budget constraint. In other
words, how can the worker commit to starting a job at time T? Note also that in our model, the
worker commits by signing a contract that species his starting date on the job.
5 Alternatively, we can assume that the job involves seasonal work, that needs to be nished2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 7
Suppose the worker insists on a delay of  periods, then this is only acceptable to
the rm if V (q;) exceeds the outside option O for the rm. One way to think of the
outside option is that the rm can draw a new job applicant at cost c. This will yield
O =  c+E(V (~ q; ~ )) where the expectation is over the quality and required delay of
the next worker. It turns out that we do not need to know much about the outside
option O to derive our results. Hence we do not introduce specic assumptions on
how search for a new match takes place if negotiations with the currently matched
employee break down.
For concreteness, we assume that the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to
the rm about the starting date for the job.6 Further we assume that the wage
cannot be varied with . This can be justied in two ways. First, the wage may
be given to the rm by an agreement with the labor unions. Second, if the wage is
determined by bilateral bargaining between rm and employee, the employee may
not be able to commit to a wage before starting the job. That is, if the worker agrees
to a low wage (in return for a high ), he will renegotiate the wage once he starts
the job. Hence the rm assumes that it will pay the employee this (renegotiated)
wage anyway, independent of . For our purposes we do not need to specify how
the wage is determined exactly. We only assume w 2 hb;qi where b denotes the
unemployment benet level. Nash bargaining between worker and rm will give
this result.
Further, we assume that the worker when asking for a delay of  periods does
not know q.7 Hence the probability that the rm rejects  is given by











before a certain date l, say the end of the summer. In that case, the second integral is from  to
l. One can verify that similar results hold in this case. Clearly, also in this case V 0
 < 0: delaying
the start of the job reduces the rm's prots as production and prot opportunities are destroyed.
6 Clearly, other assumptions would work here as well. The important point is that in negotiation
with the rm the worker feels some restriction in delaying the start of the job out of fear that
V (q;) < O. See footnote 11 below.
7 Alternatively, we can assume that the worker knows his own productivity q but not the outside
option O of the rm.2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 8




















Delaying the starting date of the job makes it more likely that the rm will look for
another worker. Longer contracts make it more likely that a rm accepts a given














Now consider a worker who is matched with a rm. The worker's wage in this
rm is given by w.9 The worker proposes to delay the starting date by  periods.
Delay  is given by the solution to
max
t (1   G(t;l))Ve(t;l;) + G(t;l)Vu() (2)
where Ve denotes the value of having a job with the starting date postponed t periods.
We focus on the case where (temporary and permanent) job opportunities satisfy
Ve(t;l;) > Vu(). Hence the solution to equation (2) does not imply G(;l) = 1.










 (l+t)Vu() + v(t;) (3)
where the utility (in terms of leisure or home production) of delay is given by
8 To ease notation, we do not assume that the outside option depends on l. In fact, we could
make this assumption. As long as the signs on the derivatives of G below are unchanged, this has
no eect on our analysis.
9 If the wage will be determined by (re)negotiation after the worker has actually started to work,
the worker does not know w exactly as he does not know q. In this case, w denotes the expected
wage.2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 9
v(t;).10 We assume v0
t;v0
 > 0 and v00
tt < 0;v00
t > 0;v000
tt < 0. In words,  determines
the preference for delay. The higher  the higher the utility and marginal utility
of delay. Finally, v00
t falls with t. We refer to  as the value of leisure or home
production.
After l+t periods, the worker loses his job and is unemployed again (which gives
him an expected discounted value Vu()). We assume that these discounted eects








































tt < 0 (8)
In words, the eects over t+l periods are small and dominated by the direct eects
of v(t;).
The trade o described in equation (2) is between increasing the utility Ve if the
rm accepts the delay (which happens with probability 1   G) and increasing the
probability of being rejected in which case the worker continues to be unemployed
with expected discounted value Vu. We assume that d(Ve(t;l;)   Vu())=d < 0.
In words, the higher the value of leisure or home production, the smaller the value
of employment compared to unemployment. A search and matching framework will
give this intuitive result. However, again, we do not need much structure on Vu and
Ve and hence do not specify how they are determined exactly by the working of the
labor market.




(Vu   Ve) + (1   G)V
0
e = 0 (9)
10 We assume that the worker signs a labor contract stipulating a starting day for the job. Hence
we do not allow the worker to use the delay period to search for a better job. Allowing this
would increase the size of the spike for the following two reasons. First, delay periods then become
cumulative. Second, delay becomes more valuable for the worker giving a higher incentive to
bargain for delays.2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 10
where V 0
e = e (b w)+(w Vu())e (l+)+v0
. Note that G0
;Ve Vu;(1 G) > 0
imply that V 0
e > 0. Because delaying the starting date increases the risk of being
rejected for the job, the worker asks for less than optimal delay in the sense that at
the margin an increase in  (still) raises Ve.11
We can now derive the following result.
Proposition 1: Assume the optimization problem given by (2) has an interior solu-







Proof of proposition 1 For an interior solution, the second order condition
implies that
jsocj =  soc =  G
00




e   (1   G)V
00
e > 0









+ (1   G)V
00














e + (1   G)V
00
el > 0 (11)
where the rst inequality follows from G0
 > 0;d(Ve   Vu)=d < 0 and assumption
(7). The second inequality follows from G00
l;G0
l < 0;V 0
e > 0 and assumptions (4)
and (6). Q.E.D.
Hence workers with a higher  postpone the starting date for a longer period.
This happens for two reasons. First, they get a higher utility from delaying the
starting date. Second, even if their proposal is rejected and they lose the job, this
is not too bad for them as the loss Ve   Vu is decreasing in .
Jobs with a longer tenure period lead to longer delays in starting the job. This
happens for two related reasons. First, higher l makes it more likely that the rm
11 This also explains why we need to introduce a rm side to our story. If the employee could
choose the delay  without any restriction, he would choose  such that V 0
e = 0. The solution to
this equation only varies with l because of the eect at l +. Because of discounting, this eect is
likely to be close to zero.2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 11
accepts the delay (that is, G0
l < 0). Second, increasing  increases the probability
that the rm rejects the employee's oer, but at a lower rate as l increases (G00
l < 0).
There are two eects going in the opposite direction. First, higher l implies that the
job is worth more, as the drop in income from w to the value of unemployment Vu
happens further away in the future. This increases the loss if the employee's oer
of  is rejected (V 0
el > 0) and may reduce . Second, higher l reduces the benet of
postponing the start of the job (V 00
el < 0). This is again due to the eect at  + l.
However, since these are eects in the future, discounting reduces the size of these
eects. If the eects are small enough, they are dominated by the rst two eects.
Finally, we can show the following.
Proposition 2: If V 00
e;V 000
el;G00




Proof of proposition 2 A sucient condition for d2




l(Ve   Vu)   G0
lV 0
e + (1   G)V 00
el)=d < 0 while djsocj=d > 0. Let us consider














e + (1   G)V
000
el < 0
because of assumptions (5) and V 00
e;V 000
el close to zero together with G00
l < 0;d(Vu 
















d is assumed to be small, G0
 > 0 and assumptions (7) and (8). Q.E.D.
Hence we see that higher  employees delay more (for each l). And for higher
 the eect of l on  becomes smaller. If it is correct to assume that women have
a higher value of home production (e.g. because they are not breadwinner), this
result explains the ndings below that women postpone more jobs (both temporary
and permanent) and the dierential eect between temporary and permanent jobs
is smaller in terms of delay.
The conditions in the proposition are sucient and not necessary. Although, the
conditions are rather technical, they have the following interpretation. We know that2 Optimal delay in job acceptance – theory 12
d=dl > 0 and we want to understand when this derivative is smaller as  goes up.
There are three eects going against this. First, V 00
e > 0: higher  leads to a
higher marginal value of delay. This tends to raise d=dl as higher l decreases the
probability that the match is dissolved. Second V 000
el > 0: longer term contracts are
more valuable to postpone as  goes up (that is, V 00
el < 0 increases with ). This
tends to raise d=dl as well. Third, if G00
 > 0 (which is the case above if the worker
does not know q and H is uniform), an increase in  makes the problem less concave,
as the loss Ve   Vu falls with . This makes the agent's problem more elastic and
tends to blow up d=dl as  increases. Hence we need to assume that these eects
are relatively small.
2.2 Spikes
The delay in starting a job, described above, can lead to spikes in the unemployment
outow rate. Let l denote the arrival rate of jobs with duration l for an unemployed
worker searching for a job.
Proposition 3: If v0







where l denotes the solution to equation (9).
Proof of proposition 3 First, note that v0
t(0;) < w implies that for t > T
(when the benet level b is reduced to 0), the starting date of a job is not delayed
at all. In that case, V 0
et =  w + v0
t(0;) < 0 and hence  = 0. Further, with the
assumption made above that v00
tt < 0 we also nd that jobs found at time t < T are
never postponed past T because v0
t(T   t;) < v0
t(0;) < w.
Hence the outow at time T is the \sum" (actually \integral") of workers matched
with l-jobs from time T  l till T. The stock of \free" workers at time t that can be
matched with an l-job is given by workers who up till then have not been matched




The assumptions imply that a worker who has found a job, never delays the start
of the job beyond the expiration date T. Moreover, if a worker nds a job at date3 Data and stylized facts 13
t > T he does not postpone at all. Although we do not need such a strong result, it
simplies the exposition. We only need that a group with positive mass do not go
beyond T. This result is reminiscent of the Meyer (1990) and Mott and Nicholson
(1982) kinked budget constraint result.
We get a spike because people matched over the interval [T  l;T] all ow out of
unemployment at the same time T. For given l, this outow is bigger, the longer
the delay l. If the delay  is zero for a certain type of job, there is { in principle {
no spike.
By way of illustration we did some numerical simulations. The simulations con-
cern a labor market with temporary jobs that last 12 months and \permanent" jobs
that last 32 months. The monthly job oer arrival rates are 0.08 for temporary
jobs and 0.02 for permanent jobs. Under some additional assumptions, which are
presented and discussed in more detail in Appendix A we nd that with a perma-
nent job the worker delays the start of the job by 3 months, while a worker with a
temporary job does not delay at all. Figure 1 shows in the case where the maximum
benet duration is 9 months the evolution of the outow rates to temporary and
permanent jobs. Comparing the outow rate at the spike with the average outow
at non-spike periods is one way to measure the size of the spike. This we call the
relative size of the spike. In the example in the appendix, we nd that a delay of
three months leads to a relative spike equal to 4.35.
Summarizing, the theory above leads to the following testable predictions. First,
spikes are higher for permanent than for temporary jobs. If women have a higher
value of home production () than men, we nd that women delay the starting date
longer than men (for both temporary and permanent jobs). Finally, the dierence
in spike between permanent and temporary jobs is smaller for women than for men.
3 Data and stylized facts
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on administrative records of unemployment spells,
combined with selected information on formal employment spells.12 Included are
12 The data are described in more detail in Van Ours and Vodopivec (2007, 2008).3 Data and stylized facts 14
all spells of unemployment benet recipients which started between August 1, 1997
and July 31, 1998 and in the calendar year 1999 (with censoring on December 31,
2001). For each spell, the database contains starting and ending date of registered
unemployment spell, destination of exit, and the information on the receipt of unem-
ployment insurance benets (starting and ending date of the eligibility and actual
ending date of the receipt). Personal and family characteristics of recipients are
also included. To improve the information about the end of unemployment spells,
a separate source, work history data set for formal sector workers, was utilized. So,
in our dataset the end of the unemployment spell is dened as the date at which an
individual started working or left the unemployment register for other reasons. The
destination \job" is dened by administrative records as exit to private or public
employment, including self-employment. Other destinations include exits to active
labor market programs, voluntary and involuntary removal from registration, and
a miscellaneous category that includes maternity leave, military service and death.
Here, we are only interested in job nding rates. If individuals left unemployment for
other reasons their durations of unemployment are considered to be right-censored.
The data we use are suitable to explore the existence of end of benet spikes since
our data do not only cover the period when workers were covered by unemployment
benets but also the period of transition from unemployment to employment after
benets expired. The date at which individuals started working on a job is not de-
pendent on self-reporting of the unemployed workers but comes from employers. A
unique feature of the Slovenian data is that at the start of the post-unemployment
job its nature { temporary or permanent { is registered. Furthermore, we observe
how long people stay in their jobs.
In our analysis we focus on individuals that were entitled to benets for a max-
imum duration of 6, 9 or 12 months. For every unemployed worker after 3 months
the replacement rate was reduced from 70% of the previous wage to 60% (subject
to a minimum and maximum). Because the end of benets eects for some workers
coincides with a drop in the replacement rate for all workers, we ignore individuals
with a potential benet duration of 3 months. Slovenia reformed its unemployment
benets in 1998; the reform shortened the potential duration of benets for most
groups of workers. We use data from before and after the reform. Appendix B
provides more information about the data.3 Data and stylized facts 15
3.2 Stylized facts
To illustrate the end of benets eects, gures 2 and 3 show the relationship between
job nding rates and months to benet expiration for men and women, distinguished
by potential benet duration.13 There are clear spikes at benet expiration for each
of the three groups of workers. It is also clear that for temporary jobs there is a
spike at benet expiration, but in relative terms { compared to the job nding rates
2 or 3 months before benet expiration { the spikes are considerably smaller than
for the transition rate to permanent jobs.
To get a rst impression whether indeed temporary jobs are less likely to gen-
erate benet expiration spikes in the transition rate than permanent jobs, we did
some simple calculations. For each group of workers with the same potential benet
duration we divided the permanent job nding rate in the month of benet expira-
tion by this rate in the month prior to that. We did the same for the temporary
job nding rate. The rst two columns of Table 1 show the outcomes of these cal-
culations. Indeed, whereas for males the average relative spike for permanent jobs
is 3.37, it is only 1.43 for temporary jobs. For females the average relative spike for
permanent jobs is 3.91, while for temporary jobs it is 1.64.
The top part of Figure 4 shows job separation rates for men, distinguished be-
tween temporary jobs and permanent jobs. As was to be expected, the job separation
rates from temporary jobs are much higher as the job separation rates from perma-
nent jobs. There is a large spike in the job separation rate for temporary jobs at
9 months indicating the importance of xed-term contracts of that particular du-
ration. Similarly there are also spikes at 3, 6 and 12 months. The bottom part of
Figure 4 shows the job separation rates for women which are very similar to those
of men. Clearly, individuals on permanent jobs do not leave their jobs quickly; 12
months after starting on a permanent job 94% the men and 95% of the women are
still employed. From the workers on temporary jobs after 1 year 59% of the men
and 66% of the women is still employed.
13 The job nding rates are calculated on a monthly basis taking right-censored durations into
account. The same holds for the job separation rates in gure 4. Note that we can identify the
spikes because they occur at dierent unemployment durations for dierent groups of workers.
Otherwise, we could not distinguish the spike from the eect of duration dependence.4 Empirical analysis 16
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Job ﬁnding rates
The use of hazard rate models and the data with individuals facing dierent poten-
tial benet durations allow us to identify the end-of-benet spikes. We distinguish
between transition rates to permanent and to temporary jobs and start with a set-
up that is in line with our theoretical model. The rate at which individuals nd a
permanent or a temporary job at unemployment duration t conditional on observed
characteristics x and unobserved characteristics u is assumed to have the following
specication
i(t j x;ui) = i(t)exp(x
0i + ui) for i = p;n (12)
where i indicates the type of job (p=permanent, n=temporary),  is a vector of
parameters and  represents individual duration dependence, which is modeled in a
exible way by using step functions:
i(t) = exp(ki;kIk(t) + iIs(t)) for i = p;n (13)
where k (= 1,..,4) is a subscript for duration interval. We distinguish four intervals,
monthly for the rst three months, and the fourth interval larger than three months.
For reasons of normalization we impose i;4=0. If a period of delay exists, in the job
nding rate concerning permanent jobs at least the initial -parameters should be
smaller than zero. For temporary jobs this should not be the case. Furthermore, Is
is an indicator for the month of benet expiration (s = 6;9;12). The -parameters
measure the pattern of duration dependence, and  indicates the size of the spike in
the month of benet expiration. If the period of delay exists we expect a spike to
be present in the job nding rate for permanent jobs, while such a spike should be
less important in the job nding rate for temporary jobs.
The conditional density function of the completed unemployment duration ti
that ended in a transition towards a job of type i can be written as
f(ti j x;ui) = i(ti j x;ui)exp( 
Z ti
0
(p(s j x;up)+n(s j x;un))ds) for i = p;n
(14)4 Empirical analysis 17
We assume that the unobservables in both job nding rates are from discrete dis-
tributions with two points of support, which we assume to be perfectly correlated.
Then, the joint distribution also has two points of support, p1 and p2
Pr(up = up;a;un = un;a) = p1 Pr(up = up;b;un = un;b) = p2 (15)
Because the hazard rates also contain constant terms, we normalize up;a = un;a = 0.
The discrete distribution is supposed to have a logit specication with p1 =
exp()
1+exp()
and p2 = 1
1+exp(). We remove the unobserved components by taking expectations:
f(tp;tn j x) = EupEun[fp(tp j x;up):fn(tn j x;un)] (16)
The parameters are estimated with the method of maximum likelihood, taking into
account that some durations are right-censored.
The analyses are done separately for males and females to account for possible
dierences in labor market behavior. In addition to this distinction by gender the
eect of the following personal characteristics are taken into account: age, education,
family situation, health, and calendar period of inow into unemployment (see the
appendix for details).
Panel a of table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the baseline model. Age
has a negative eect on all job ndings rates. Education has a positive eect on the
job nding rate concerning permanent jobs but has no eect on the rate by which
individuals nd temporary jobs; with the exception of higher educated males who
have a smaller transition rate to temporary jobs. Family conditions do not aect
the transition rate to temporary jobs, but the eect for permanent jobs diers for
males and females. Concerning permanent jobs, males who have dependent family
members have a higher job nding rate than males who do not, but females with
dependent family members have a lower job nding rate than other females. Bad
health reduces all job nding rates substantially.
There is also evidence of unobservables aecting the job nding rates. Condi-
tional on the observable characteristics and the elapsed duration of unemployment
there is a group of 87% of the males that has a high job nding rate both to per-
manent and temporary jobs, while the remaining 13% has substantially lower job
nding rates. For women these percentages are 83 for the group with high job nding4 Empirical analysis 18
rates and 17 for the group with low job nding rates.14
The pattern of duration dependence is dierent for permanent jobs and tem-
porary jobs. For permanent jobs the job nding rate is low in the rst months of
the unemployment spell, which is support for the existence of a delay period. The
transition rate to temporary jobs in the rst months is higher than later on.
The most important parameter estimates refer to the spike in job ndings rates
at benet exhaustion. This spike is identied by comparing the job nding rate in
the month of benet expiration for some groups of workers with the identical non-
expiration month for other groups of workers. It appears that there are substantial
spikes. The job nding rate concerning permanent jobs in a month of benet ex-
piration is about 3 times as high for men and 3.7 times as high for women as in
the same month without benet expiration. Also in the transition rates to tempo-
rary jobs we nd spikes, which are about 50% (men) to 75% (women) higher than
regular job nding rates. The dierence between the spikes in the job nding rates
between permanent and temporary jobs supports our theoretical model. Apparently
for temporary jobs delaying acceptance is more dicult. Hence the spike is smaller.
Panel b of table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the spike if we impose that
there is no duration dependence. There is a clear drop in the log-likelihood value
from which we conclude that we cannot reject the pattern of duration dependence
found in panel a.
Panel c of table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the spike if we introduce a
very exible specication of duration dependence with monthly intervals for the rst
six months, and after that the intervals 6-9, 10-12, 13-18 months and 18+ months.
Furthermore, we introduce an indicator for benet expiration because individuals
may increase their search intensity after benets have expired.15 As shown the spike
in the job nding rate for permanent jobs is substantially larger than for temporary
jobs. However, as in the baseline estimates we cannot ignore the existence of a
benet spike in the exits to temporary jobs.
14 We investigated whether it was possible to estimate an extended distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity but we were not able to identify a third mass-point.
15 Note also that we can still identify  because the spike occurs at dierent unemployment
durations. If not, we could not distinguish the spike from the eect of duration dependence.4 Empirical analysis 19
4.2 Job separation rates
The type of post-unemployment jobs is registered as being permanent or xed-term,
which we interpret as being temporary. The nature of the job is labeled at the start,
but permanent jobs may not last long and temporary contracts may be extended so
that temporary jobs may last quite some time.
To investigate the determinants of job separations we estimate a proportional
hazard model where the job separation rate from jobs of type i at employment
duration t conditional on observed variables x and unobserved characteristics v

s








i + vi) for i = p;n (17)
where z is a vector of variables that indicate when the unemployed left unemploy-
ment - the month of unemployment and whether or not it was the last month of
benets before expiration. Furthermore, s and s are vectors of parameters, and
s represents individual duration dependence, which is again modeled in a exible






where k (= 1,..,10) is a subscript for duration interval and we consider the following
ten intervals: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-18, 18+. For reasons of normalization we
impose s
i;1=0. The conditional density function of completed job durations and the
likelihood function are set-up as before. As with the job nding rates also for the job
separation rates we assume that the unobservables are from discrete distributions
with two points of support, which we assume to be perfectly correlated.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 3. The duration of permanent
jobs for males is aected by their age, education and health. Older, lower educated
males with bad health have a higher job separation rates than their counterparts.
For females the separation rate form permanent jobs is not aected by any personal
characteristic. The duration of temporary jobs is only aected by age and family
situation. Older individuals are more likely to loose their temporary job quickly.
The eect of family situation diers for males and females. Whereas males with 1
dependent family member are more likely to loose their temporary job, females with
2 or more dependent family members are less likely to loose their job.4 Empirical analysis 20
Remarkably, for permanent jobs the duration doesn't depend on the previous
unemployment spell. It doesn't matter whether an unemployed worker nds a per-
manent job early on in the unemployment spell or much later, the job separation
rate is equally high. It's also irrelevant whether or not the unemployed worker nds
a permanent job in the month of benet expiration. Apparently, it is not just the
\strong" worker that postpones his or her start until the moment at which benets
expire. This is support for our hypothesis that it is the delay in acceptance which is
driving the benet spike. For temporary jobs the previous unemployment spell has
some importance. Especially workers that nd a temporary job in the rst month
of their unemployment spell are more likely to loose this job quickly. Males that
nd a temporary job in the month of benet expiration are less likely to loose this
job quickly. This could point at reverse causality. Males that have the opportunity
to start on a long term temporary job are more likely to postpone this start until
the month of benet expiration. Again, this would be support for our delay theory.
Concerning unobserved heterogeneity the results are dierent for permanent jobs
and temporary jobs. Whereas for permanent jobs we found no indication of unob-
served heterogeneity, for temporary jobs we do nd that unobserved heterogeneity
aects the separation rate. Most temporary jobs exist only shortly but there are
also temporary jobs which last very long.16 Conditional on the observed character-
istics, the unemployment history and the duration of the employment spell there is
a group of temporary jobs of 82% for males (80% for females) that last short, while
the complementary 18% (20% for females) lasts very long.
4.3 Temporary jobs
4.3.1 Finding and separating
The relationship between the benet expiration spike and the duration of the rst
job may be aected by correlation between unobservables in the job nding rate and
the job separation rate. To investigate this we estimate a bivariate duration model
with correlated error terms. We do the estimates for temporary jobs, separately for
males and females.
16 In the estimates one of the mass points turned out to be very small, converging to minus
innity.4 Empirical analysis 21
In both the job nding rate for temporary jobs and the job separation rate from
temporary jobs we introduce unobserved heterogeneity. Both rates are now specied
as
n(t j x;un) = (t)exp(x














where un and us
n represent unobserved heterogeneity. As before, we assume that
the unobservables in both the job nding rate and the job separation rate are from
discrete distributions with two points of support which are integrated out of the
likelihood specication.
The main parameter estimates are summarized in Table 4. As shown the second
mass points are negative for the job nding rate and positive for the job separation
rate. Conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed durations of the
unemployment and employment spells individuals that have a low job nding rate
also have a high job separation rate. If it takes a long time to nd a job, the job
found doesn't last very long. However, the size of the benet exhaustion spikes are
not inuenced by the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity. They are almost
identical to the ones presented in Table 2.
4.3.2 The duration of temporary jobs reconsidered
Our theory predicts that there is a positive correlation between the expected dura-
tion of a job and the size of the benet expiration spike. We showed that indeed
for permanent jobs there is a larger spike in the job nding rate than for temporary
jobs. However, there is a large variation in the duration of temporary jobs. Some
ex ante temporary jobs turn out to be ex post long employment spells. Our theory
also predicts that the benet expiration spike should be bigger for long temporary
jobs.
To investigate a rst impression whether indeed shorter temporary jobs are less
likely to generate benet expiration spikes in the transition rate to these jobs, as
before we calculated the relative spike as the job nding rate in the month of benet
expiration divided by the job nding rate in the month previous to that .17 The
17 Note that some job durations were right censored with a duration less than 1 year. This causes
a bias in the calculations for jobs that lasted less than 1 year.4 Empirical analysis 22
results of these calculations are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. For
males with a potential benet duration of 6 months the relative spike for short-
term temporary jobs is 0.79, i.e. there is no spike at all. For the same category
of workers the relative spike for long-term temporary jobs equals 1.76. On average
there is no relative spike for short-term jobs while the relative spike for long-term
jobs is 1.82. These ndings conrm our theoretical model. For females the results
are less clear. On average there are spikes for short-term temporary jobs and for
long-term temporary jobs. The last type of spike is larger than the rst type but
the dierences are small. This is consistent with our results (in propositions 1 and
2) that for workers with higher value of home production (assuming this is the case
for women) both types of jobs are postponed and the dierence in delay is smaller
(compared to workers with lower )
4.4 The Slovenian labor market reconsidered
An important issue that may arise when analyzing the Slovenian labor market is the
interpretation of behavior of workers in relation to the informal sector. Vodopivec
(1995) indicates that in the early 1990s unemployed workers is Slovenia might have
collected unemployment compensation and work at the same time under informal
employment. Vodopivec claims that during 1990-92 there was a tendency among
the recipients of unemployment benets in Slovenia to stay unemployed until their
benets expired before taking a job. If so, benet exhaustion spikes wouldn't have
much to do with delay behavior as we claim. Instead, they would simply reect the
end of a waiting for benets to expire period. Nevertheless, Slovenian legislators in
1993 and 1994 enacted several laws to prevent this type of waiting behavior from
happening. In 1998, there was a major reform of unemployment benets drastically
reducing the potential benet duration, roughly by half for most groups of recipients.
As indicated by Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006), the 1998 reform also called for
several measures aimed at speeding up benet recipients' reemployment, including
improvement in employment services, the obligatory preparation of a reemployment
plan for each benet recipient, and more frequent contact between counselors and
recipients. Furthermore, reform called for stricter monitoring of eligibility. Benet
recipients had to make themselves available to employment oce counselors several5 Conclusions 23
hours a day. For the rst time, inspectors (a special arm of employment oces)
would check to see if benet recipients were in fact unemployed (inter alia, by paying
home visits to benet recipients) and actively searching for a job. To the extent
that collecting benets and working in the informal sector until benets expire was
an issue, this should have been more prevalent before the 1998 reform. Tougher
monitoring of the unemployment status should have ruled out a lot of this type of
abuse. Nevertheless, to investigate this issue in more detail we performed separate
estimates on data collected before and after the reform. Table 5 shows the relevant
parameter estimates. Clearly there is no tendency for exhaustion spikes in the job
nding rates to be smaller after the reform. And, the dierence in the size of the
spikes between permanent jobs and temporary jobs is present as much after the
reform as it was before the reform. From this we conclude that although we cannot
rule out some inuence of the informal sector, this doesn't seem to be an important
explanation for the existence of the end-of-benet spikes.
5 Conclusions
Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benets tends to introduce a
\spike" in the job nding rate just before benet exhaustion. Previous studies refer
to two alternative explanation for the existence of such a spike. First, a static labor
supply model in which a kink in the budget constraint causes many individuals to
choose the same benet duration. Second, a non-stationary search model in which
the job nding rate is slowly increasing due to increasing search intensity and falling
reservation wages. In neither of the two models the nature of the job is important.
Our study presents a theoretical model in which the nature of the job aect the size
of the end-of-benet spike. In our model spikes in the job nding rates are caused
by delays between job nding and the start of the job. Workers prefer to delay
and make an oer to the rm about the starting date for the job. The rm will
only accept a delay if the value of the job including delay is larger than the value
of searching for a new worker, who may (also) have a preference for delay. When
workers decide about their oer to the rm they take into account that the rm
might reject the oer if the delay is too long. They also take into account that long-
lasting jobs have more value to the rm so for these jobs employers are more likely5 Conclusions 24
to accept longer delays. From our theoretical model we derive that delays are more
likely to occur for permanent jobs than for temporary jobs. Our model assumes
that workers who have found a job will never delay the start of the job beyond the
expiration date of their benets, since that would be too costly. This causes many
unemployed to leave unemployment at benet exhaustion thus causing a spike in
the job nding rate. Since the delay period is longer the size of the end-of-benet
spike will be larger for permanent jobs than for temporary jobs. We investigate the
validity of our model using Slovenian unemployment data which have the unique
feature that the temporary or permanent nature of the post-unemployment job is
registered. Indeed, we nd that spikes are more likely to occur in transitions from
unemployment to permanent jobs.
All in all, we conclude that end-of-benet spikes in job nding rates are related
to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers
will accept delays in starting date of a new job. Thus the spikes in the job nding
rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benets for subsidized
leisure.6 References 25
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7 Appendices
Appendix A: Numerical simulations on delay period and
spike
To illustrate the relationship between the delay period and the spike, we consider
two types of job: temporary (l = 12 months) and \permanent" (l = 32 months).
Job arrival rates per month for these jobs equal 12 = 0:08;32 = 0:02 resp. We
normalize the wage at w = 1 and assume b = 0:6. The discount rate equals
 = 0:1=12 per month, that is 10% on a yearly basis. Instead of specifying, the
uncertainty of the worker over q and the rm's outside option O, we directly specify
G(t;l) = t
tu(1+l(tu t)) with tu = 6 months. The interpretation of this function is
as follows. No rm accepts a delay of longer than 6 months (i.e. G(tu;tu) = 1).
Further, higher l reduces the probability that an oer t < tu is rejected. We specify
the value Ve as in equation (3) with the value of losing the job in l + t periods time
equal to b + .18 Finally, we do not model the precise search and matching on the
labor market. We simply assume that the loss of being rejected by the rm equals
Ve   Vu = 0:1(1   )Ve. That is, for an agent with  = 0, the loss of losing this job
equals 10% of the value of the job. This is not a big loss. Intuitively, the worker
receives unemployment benets b (till period T) and will be matched with other
jobs in the future. The loss falls with  and when  = w = 1 (home production is
as productive as an outside job) there is no loss at all. As above, the worker chooses
 to maximize W = Ve   G  (Ve   Vu). Table A1 summarizes the outcomes for
two values of . With  = 0:5, a worker who nds a temporary job does not delay
at all. This is roughly consistent with what we see in the data for men.19 With a
permanent job, this worker delays the start of the job by 3 months. A worker with
higher value of leisure,  = 0:8, delays the start of both jobs. Note however, that the
dierence in delay is smaller for  = 0:8 than it is for  = 0:5 (as 3   0 > 5   3:5).
This is consistent with proposition 2.
To get an idea what determines the size of a spike, we go back to the example
18 That is, for simplicity we do not model the probability of nding another job again after losing
this one in l + t months.
19 The column labeled
spikel
l will be discussed below.7 Appendices 28




0.5 12 0.0 0.90
0.5 32 3.0 4.35
0.8 12 3.5 3.72
0.8 32 5.0 5.39
with  = 0:5. The stock of \free people" at time t looking for a job is given by
s(t) = e
 (32+12)t (21)
However, this stock is not observed. The observed stock of unemployed at t evolves




only people matched with a temporary job leave the observed stock of unemployed.
Then for t 2 [32;Ti, we have
s
0
o(t) =  12s(t)   32s(t   32)
In addition to people leaving for temporary jobs, we have people leaving for perma-
nent jobs who were matched with these permanent jobs 32 periods ago.
At t = T we have
s
0




Finally, for t > T all jobs are accepted immediately and observed and actual
stocks are the same:
so(t) = s(t) = e
 (32+12)t
In Figure 1 the outow rates are dened with the observed stock so(t) in the
denominator. The gure shows us the following. The spike for permanent jobs is
4.35 times (see Table A1) the average outow rate to a permanent job before and
after the spike (i.e. over the interval [0;t] for t > T). This average outow rate is
approximated by 32.20 Further note that the outow rate to permanent jobs just
20 Indeed from time 0 to any t > T the average outow rate equals 32 as the delay eect is
averaged out after the spike.7 Appendices 29
before T is higher than after T. This is due to the fact that before T, the observed
outow equals 32s(t   32). That is, it is determined by a delayed stock which is
higher (as the stock falls over time) than the current stock. After T the outow
is given by 32s(t) and hence the outow rate is equal to 32 = 0:02. Note that
the spike with \relative size" 4.35 is generated by a three month delay in accepting
permanent jobs. That is, the spike itself does not directly give us the delay in
months.
Now consider the temporary outow rate. For months before T this rate is
below 12 = 0:08. This is because the stock of \free" agents that would accept a
temporary job right away is smaller than the observed stock of unemployed which
includes workers that have accepted permanent jobs but have not started yet due




As can be seen in table A1, with s = 0:8 we get spikes (bigger than 1) for
both types of jobs. But the dierence in spikes is smaller than for s = 0:5 (as
5:39   3:72 < 4:35   0:9).
Appendix B: Variables used in the analysis
In the analysis we use the following variables:
 Age: continuous variable
 Education: dummy variables, Education2 = elementary school, Education3
= vocational school, Education4 = high school or more, reference group =
unnished elementary school
 Family situation: dummy variables, Family1 = 1 dependent family member,
Family2 = more than 1 dependent family member, reference group = no de-
pendent family members
 Ill health: Dummy variable derived from information obtained by employment
oce councilors from interviews with benet recipients
21 The simulations calculate outows per day. The sum of these outows over the days of the
months is divided by the average stock in that month. This approximation of the outow rate per
month also causes small deviations from the true 's.7 Appendices 30
 Potential Benet Duration (PBD) and time of entrance into unemployment
(before or after the policy change): 5 dummy variables, Group 2 = PBD of 9
months, entrance before, Group 3 = PBD of 6 months, entrance after, Group 4
= PBD of 12 months, entrance before, Group 5 = PBD of 6 months, entrance
after, Group 6 = PBD of 9 months, entrance after; reference group = PBD of
6 months, entrance before.
The characteristics of our dataset are presented in Table B1:
Table B1: Means of variables
Males Females Males Females
Age/10 3.24 3.16 Group 2 0.19 0.18
Educ2 0.27 0.23 Group 3 0.16 0.18
Educ3 0.42 0.32 Group 4 0.23 0.20
Educ4 0.26 0.41 Group 5 0.18 0.18
Reference 0.05 0.04 Group 6 0.17 0.17
Reference 0.07 0.09
Family1 0.20 0.26
Family2 0.28 0.42 Permanent job
Reference 0.52 0.32 Completed duration 0.35 0.36
Incomplete duration 0.65 0.64
Bad health 0.08 0.06
Reference 0.92 0.94 Temporary job
Completed duration 0.66 0.60
Temporary job 0.54 0.51 Incomplete duration 0.34 0.40
Permanent job 0.18 0.14
Incomplete spell 0.28 0.34 Observations 5583 64788 Graphs and tables 31
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Fig. 1: Monthly exit rates to permanent and temporary jobs; numerical
simulations
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Tab. 1: Spikes by potential benet duration
Permanent Temporary jobs
jobs Total <1 year 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Males
6 months 2.68 1.31 0.79 1.76
9 months 7.14 1.58 1.39 1.75
12 months 2.88 1.80 1.18 2.36
Average 3.37 1.43 0.98 1.82
Females
6 months 3.78 1.39 1.27 1.47
9 months 2.83 1.71 1.59 1.76
12 months 10.15 3.18 3.54 3.04
Average 3.91 1.64 1.50 1.71
Note that the average relative spike is calculated as the job nding rate in the month of
benet expiration divided by the job nding rate in the month previous to that. Also
note that the distinction between the duration of temporary jobs is based on ex post
information.8 Graphs and tables 37
Tab. 2: Parameter estimates job nding rates { baseline model
Males Females
Permanent job Temporary job Permanent job Temporary job
a. Baseline model
Age/10 -0.53 (5.3)** -0.46 (7.9)** -0.35 (3.3)** -0.50 (8.9)**
Educ2 0.11 (0.5) -0.03 (0.3) 1.19 (2.5)** -0.02 (0.2)
Educ3 0.55 (2.7)** -0.13 (1.4) 1.64 (3.5)** -0.15 (1.3)
Educ4 0.87 (4.2)** -0.44 (4.5)** 2.13 (4.6)** -0.13 (1.2)
Family1 0.12 (1.4) -0.00 (0.0) -0.26 (2.8)** 0.06 (1.0)
Family2 0.16 (2.0)* 0.01 (0.2) -0.24 (2.8)** 0.01 (0.3)
Bad health -2.25 (12.5)** -1.81 (21.7)** -2.21 (8.8)** -2.09 (19.0)**
Group 2 0.05 (0.4) 0.15 (1.7)* 0.26 (2.0)** 0.03 (0.3)
Group 3 0.19 (1.3) 0.27 (2.9)** 0.17 (1.2) 0.24 (2.8)**
Group 4 0.09 (0.6) 0.23 (2.4)** 0.26 (1.7)* 0.08 (0.8)
Group 5 0.54 (3.3)** 0.42 (4.2)** 0.29 (1.8)* 0.47 (5.1)**
Group 6 0.71 (3.8)** 0.56 (4.8)** 0.51 (2.6)** 0.73 (6.6)**
Constant -6.00 (17.6)** -4.46 (22.8)** -8.15 (14.8)** -4.62 (23.0)**
First months
Month 1 -0.63 (5.0)** 0.17 (2.9)** -0.21 (1.7)* 0.32 (5.8)**
Month 2 -0.39 (3.2)** 0.12 (2.0)** -0.12 (1.0) 0.08 (1.2)
Month 3 -0.29 (2.4)** 0.45 (8.0)** -0.07 (0.6) 0.21 (3.6)**
Spike 1.09 (11.8)** 0.42 (5.5)** 1.32 (14.6)** 0.55 (8.4)**
Unobs. heterogeneity
Masspoint 2 -7.66 (17.3)** -9.91 (2.4)** -9.99 (15.2)**  1
 1.89 (12.9)** 1.61 (19.1)**
-Loglikelihood 29,289.0 32,148.1
b. No initial drop
Spike 1.30 (14.7)** 0.35 (4.6)** 1.39 (16.0)** 0.47 (7.3)**
-Loglikelihood 29,331.9 32,168.1
c. Extended model
Spike 1.63 (11.3)** 0.59 (6.1)** 1.60 (11.6)** 0.66 (7.8)**
-Loglikelihood 29,216.3 32,140.3
Observations 5583 6478
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signicance at a 95% (90%) level.8 Graphs and tables 38
Tab. 3: Parameter estimates job separation rates { baseline model
Males Females
Permanent job Temporary job Permanent job Temporary job
Age/10 0.48 (3.4)** 0.36 (4.3)** 0.15 (0.9) 0.31 (3.9)**
Educ2 -0.41 (1.4) 0.23 (1.9)* -0.44 (0.5) -0.13 (0.8)
Educ3 -0.72 (2.6)** 0.04 (0.3) -0.60 (0.7) -0.10 (0.7)
Educ4 -0.96 (3.3)** 0.01 (0.1) -0.75 (0.9) -0.22 (1.3)
Family1 -0.15 (1.0) 0.25 (3.3)** 0.13 (0.9) -0.02 (0.2)
Family2 -0.08 (0.6) 0.01 (0.1) -0.13 (0.9) -0.11 (1.7)*
Bad health 0.56 (2.0)** 0.19 (1.6) 0.58 (1.6) 0.17 (0.9)
Month 2 0.01 (0.0) 0.12 (1.0) -0.49 (1.1) 0.23 (1.8)*
Month 3 0.50 (1.4) 0.52 (4.7)** 0.34 (1.0) 0.64 (5.1)**
Month 4 -0.38 (0.8) 0.10 (0.8) -0.45 (1.0) 0.51 (3.9)**
Month 5 -0.03 (0.1) 0.21 (1.7)* -0.59 (1.3) 0.88 (7.2)**
Month 6 -0.18 (0.4) 0.25 (2.0)** -0.09 (0.2) 0.44 (3.2)**
Month 7-9 0.14 (0.4) 0.41 (3.9)** -0.06 (0.2) 0.07 (0.6)
Month 10-12 0.15 (0.5) 0.29 (2.6)** -0.13 (0.4) 0.31 (2.4)**
Month 13-18 -0.09 (0.3) -0.36 (3.0)** 0.02 (0.1) 0.02 (1.2)
Month 18+ -0.05 (0.2) -0.39 (3.0)** -0.21 (0.7) -0.19 (1.3)
After expiration -0.10 (0.3) -0.09 (0.6) -0.08 (0.3) 0.32 (2.1)**
Left unemployment
Month 2 0.06 (0.2) -0.67 (6.8)** -0.07 (0.3) -0.47 (4.3)**
Month 3 0.19 (0.8) -0.53 (5.3)** 0.12 (0.4) -0.24 (2.1)**
Month 4 0.09 (0.4) -0.67 (6.0)** 0.06 (0.2) -0.39 (3.2)**
Month 5 0.05 (0.2) -0.43 (3.7)** 0.32 (1.1) -0.27 (2.1)**
Month 6 -0.42 (1.3) -0.76 (5.0)** -0.07 (0.2) -0.52 (3.6)**
Month 7-9 -0.26 (0.9) -0.62 (4.9)** 0.18 (0.6) -0.59 (4.5)**
Month 10-12 -0.06 (0.2) -0.61 (3.6)** -0.02 (0.1) -0.72 (4.1)**
Month 13-18 0.07 (0.2) -0.58 (2.8)** 0.07 (0.2) -0.56 (2.9)**
Month 18+ -0.11 (0.2) -0.47 (2.0)** 0.39 (0.9) -0.59 (2.9)**
In \spike" month -0.35 (2.3)** -0.26 (2.0)** 0.08 (0.3) 0.01 (0.1)
Constant -7.87 (13.5)** -7.05 (24.8)** -7.03 (6.8)** -6.95 (24.2)**
Masspoint 2 {  1 {  1
 { 1.50 (11.4)** { 1.41 (6.9)**
Observations 1027 2973 939 3307
Not reported are the parameter estimates related dummy variables for each of the 6 groups
of unemployed; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signicance at a 95%
(90%) level.8 Graphs and tables 39




Job nding -0.76 (2.9)** -0.95 (2.3)**
Job separation 2.56 (14.6)** 2.47 (4.7)**
Spike 0.56 (6.0)** 0.67 (7.7)**
 -1.02 (4.5)** -1.39 (2.5)**
N 5529 6433
Note that the number of observations is smaller than in the estimates of Table 2 because for
males (females) 54 (45) the duration at the job (either completed or incomplete) is missing
are therefore these individuals are removed from the sample. Not reported are the other
parameter estimates; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signicance at
a 95% (90%) level.8 Graphs and tables 40
Tab. 5: Parameter estimates spikes { before and after the 1998 reform
Males Permanent jobs Temporary jobs Observations
Before 1.51 (8.4)** 0.58 (4.5)** 2741
After 1.89 (6.6)** 0.51 (2.9)** 2842
Total 1.63 (11.3)** 0.59 (6.1)** 5583
Females
Before 1.56 (9.4)** 0.72 (6.4)** 3119
After 1.61 (5.2)** 0.61 (4.0)** 3359
Total 1.60 (11.6)** 0.66 (7.8)** 6478
The \total" estimates are the same as those reported in Table 2 panel c; absolute t-
statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signicance at a 95% (90%) level.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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